Abstract. Bit commitment schemes are at the basis of modern cryptography. Since information-theoretic security is impossible both in the classical and in the quantum regime, we examine computationally secure commitment schemes. In this paper we study worst-case complexity assumptions that imply quantum bit commitment schemes. First, we show that QSZK ⊆ QMA implies a computationally hiding and statistically binding auxiliary-input quantum commitment scheme. We then extend our result to show that the much weaker assumption QIP ⊆ QMA (which is weaker than PSPACE ⊆ PP) implies the existence of auxiliary-input commitment schemes with quantum advice. Finally, to strengthen the plausibility of the separation QSZK ⊆ QMA, we find a quantum oracle relative to which honest-verifier QSZK is not contained in QCMA, the class of languages that can be verified using a classical proof in quantum polynomial time.
Introduction
The goal of modern cryptography is to design protocols that remain secure under the weakest possible complexity assumptions. Such fundamental protocols include commitment schemes, authentication, one-way functions, and pseudorandom generators. All these cc 25 (2016) primitives have been shown equivalent: for example, commitment schemes imply one-way functions (Impagliazzo & Luby 1989) , and one-way functions imply commitments (Haitner et al. 2009; Håstad et al. 1999; Naor 1991) .
In this paper, we study complexity assumptions that imply commitment schemes, which are the basis for many cryptographic constructions, such as zero knowledge protocols for NP (Ben-Or et al. 1990; Goldreich et al. 1991) . A commitment scheme is a twophase protocol between a sender and a receiver. In the commit phase, the sender interacts with the receiver so that by the end of the phase, the sender is bound to a specific bit, which remains hidden from the receiver until the reveal phase of the protocol, where the receiver learns the bit.
There are two security conditions for such schemes: binding (the sender cannot reveal more than one value) and hiding (the receiver has no information about the bit before the reveal phase). These conditions can hold statistically, i.e., against an unbounded adversary, or computationally, i.e., against a polynomial-time adversary. Without further assumptions these conditions cannot both hold statistically (Lo & Chau 1997; Mayers 1997) .
The main complexity assumptions that have been used for the construction of one-way functions, and hence commitments, involve the classes of Computational and Statistical Zero Knowledge. Ostrovsky & Wigderson (1993) proved that if Computational Zero Knowledge (ZK) is not trivial, then there exists a family of functions that are not 'easy to invert.' The result was extended by Vadhan (2006) to show that if ZK does not equal Statistical Zero Knowledge (SZK), then there exists an auxiliary-input one-way function, i.e., one can construct a one-way function given an auxiliary input (or else advice). Auxiliary-input cryptographic primitives are natural when considering worst-case complexity classes: The auxiliary input can encode a 'hard' instance of a problem known only to be hard in the worst case. Last, Ostrovsky and Wigderson also showed that if ZK contains a 'hard-on-average' problem, then 'regular' one-way functions exist.
With the advent of quantum computation and cryptography, one needs to revisit computational security, since many widely used cc 25 (2016) Quantum commitments 105 computational assumptions, such as the hardness of factoring or the discrete logarithm problem, become false when the adversary is a polynomial-time quantum machine (Shor 1997) .
In this paper, we study worst-case complexity assumptions under which quantum commitment schemes exist. As in the classical case, we obtain auxiliary-input commitments: commitments that can be constructed with classical and/or quantum advice. As our commitments are quantum, we define the computational security properties against quantum poly-time adversaries (who also receive an arbitrary quantum auxiliary input).
Our first result involves the class QSZK of Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge.
Theorem 1.1. If QSZK ⊆ QMA, then there exists a noninteractive auxiliary-input quantum commitment scheme that is statistically binding and computationally hiding.
Before explaining this result, let us try to see what an equivalent classical result would mean. At a high level, the classical statement would be of the following form: If SZK is not in MA, then auxiliary-input commitments exist. However, under some derandomization assumptions, we have that NP = MA = AM (Klivans & van Melkebeek 2002; Miltersen & Vinodchandran 2006) and since SZK ⊆ AM, we conclude that SZK ⊆ MA. Hence, the equivalent classical assumption is quite strong and, if one believes in derandomization, possibly false.
However, in the quantum setting, it would be surprising if QSZK was actually contained in QMA. We know that QSZK ⊆ QIP[2] (Watrous 2009), where QIP[2] is the class of languages that have quantum interactive proofs with two messages (note that one only needs three messages to get the whole power of quantum interactive proofs). So far, any attempt to reduce QIP[2] or QSZK to QMA or find any plausible assumptions that would imply it, has not been fruitful. This seems harder than in the classical case. The main reason is that the verifier's message cannot be reduced to a public coin message nor to a pure quantum state. His message is entangled with his quantum workspace, and this seems inherent for the class QIP[2] as well as for QSZK. It would be striking if cc 25 (2016) one can get rid of this entanglement and reduce these classes to a single message from the prover.
If we weaken the security condition to hold against quantum adversaries with only classical auxiliary input, then the above assumption also becomes weaker, i.e., QSZK ⊆ QCMA, where QCMA is the class where the quantum verifier receives a single classical message from the prover. We give (quantum) oracle evidence for this by showing the following.
Theorem 1.2. There exists a quantum oracle A such that QSZK
A HV
⊆ QCMA
A .
Note that honest-verifier QSZK HV = QSZK (Watrous 2009 ) in the unrelativized case. Our proof of this result extends Aaronson and Kuperberg's result that there is a quantum oracle A such that QMA A ⊆ QCMA A (Aaronson & Kuperberg 2007) . Subsequent to the completion of this work, Aaronson has shown the stronger result that there is an oracle A such that SZK A ⊆ QMA A (Aaronson 2012) . This result implies that our assumption that QSZK ⊆ QMA is true relative to an oracle.
We then show the existence of commitment schemes based on a much weaker complexity assumption about quantum interactive proofs. More precisely, we look at the class QIP, which was first studied in Watrous (2003) . This class is believed to be much larger than QSZK. We consider this class and its relation to QMA to show the following Note that QIP = PSPACE (Jain et al. 2010) and QMA ⊆ PP (Marriott & Watrous 2005) , so our assumption is extremely weak, in fact weaker than PSPACE ⊆ PP. Of course, with such a weak assumption we get a weaker form of commitment: The advice is now quantum. Thus, in order for the prover and the verifier to efficiently perform the commitment for a security parameter n, they cc 25 (2016) Quantum commitments 107 need to receive a classical auxiliary input as well as quantum advice of size polynomial in n. This quantum advice is a quantum state on poly(n) qubits that is not efficiently constructible (otherwise, we could have reduced the quantum advice to classical advice by describing the efficient circuit that produces it). Moreover, the quantum advice we consider does not create entanglement between the players.
The key point behind this result is the structure of QIP. More precisely, we use the fact that there exists a QIP-complete problem where the protocol has only three rounds and the verifier's message is a single coin. The equivalent classical result would say that if three-message protocols with a single coin as a second message are more powerful than MA, then commitments exist. Again, classically, if we believe that AM = MA, then this assumption is false. Taking this assumption to the quantum realm, it becomes 'almost' true, unless PSPACE = PP.
All of our commitment schemes are non-interactive, a feature that is useful in many applications. From QIP ⊆ QMA, we construct both statistically hiding and computationally binding commitments as well as statistically binding and computationally hiding ones, whose constructions are conceptually different. In order to prove the security of the first construction, we prove a parallel repetition theorem for protocols based on the swap test that may be of independent interest. From the QSZK ⊆ QMA assumption, we show here only statistically binding and computationally hiding commitments, but computationally binding and statistically hiding commitments can be similarly shown.
Definitions
In order to define the statistical distance between quantum states, we use the trace norm, given by X tr = tr √ X † X = max U |tr XU |, where the maximization is taken over all unitaries U of the appropriate size. Given one of two quantum states ρ, σ with equal probability, the optimal measurement to distinguish them succeeds with probability 1/2+ ρ − σ tr /4 (Helstrom 1967) . Note that this measurement is not generally efficient.
108 Chailloux, Kerenidis & Rosgen cc 25 (2016) The diamond norm is a generalization of the trace norm to quantum channels that preserves the distinguishability characterization. Given one of two channels Q 0 , Q 1 with equal probability, the optimal distinguishing procedure that uses the channel only once succeeds with probability 1/2 + Q 0 − Q 1 /4. The diamond norm is more complicated to define than the trace norm, however, as the optimal distinguishing procedure may need to use an auxiliary space of size equal to the input space (Kitaev 1997; Smith 1983) . For a linear map Q : L(H) → L(K) with an auxiliary space F with dim F = dim H, the diamond norm can be defined as Q = max X∈L(H⊗F ) Q(X) tr / X tr . One inconvenient property of the diamond norm is that for some maps the maximum in the definition may not be achieved on a quantum state. Fortunately, in the case of the difference of two completely positive maps this maximum is achieved by a pure state.
Lemma 2.1 (Rosgen & Watrous 2005) . 
Closely related to the diamond norm is a norm studied in operator theory known as the completely bounded norm. An upper bound on this norm can be found in Paulsen (2002) . Since the diamond norm is dual to this norm, this bound may also be applied to the diamond norm. See Johnston et al. (2009) for a discussion of this bound and the relationship between the diamond and completely bounded norms.
In addition to these norms, we will also make use of the fidelity between two quantum states (Jozsa 1994) , which is given by F(ρ, σ) = tr √ σρ √ σ. One property that is important for the cc 25 (2016) Quantum commitments 109 results in this paper is that the fidelity only increases under the application of a quantum channel. Specifically, tracing out a portion of two states can only increase their fidelity, i.e., for ρ, σ density matrices on H ⊗ K, it holds that
We also make significant use of the following two properties of the fidelity.
Lemma 2.3 (Fuchs & van de Graaf 1999). For any density matrices ρ and
Lemma 2.4 (Nayak & Shor 2003; Spekkens & Rudolph 2001) . For any density matrices ρ and σ,
2.1. Quantum interactive complexity classes. The class QMA, first studied in Watrous (2000) , is informally the class of all problems that can be verified by a quantum polynomial-time algorithm with access to a quantum proof.
where a, b are any efficiently computable functions of |x| with a > b with at least an inverse polynomial gap (Kitaev et al. 2002; Marriott & Watrous 2005) . If ρ is restricted to be a classical string, the class is called QCMA.
The class QIP, first studied in Watrous (2003) , consists of those problems that can be interactively verified in quantum polynomial time. A recent result is that QIP = PSPACE (Jain et al. 2010 (ii) if x ∈ L, then for any prover P , (V, P ) accepts with probability at most b.
As in QMA, we require only that a > b with at least an inverse polynomial gap (Kitaev & Watrous 2000) .
One key property of QIP is that any quantum interactive proof system can be simulated by one using only three messages (Kitaev & Watrous 2000) . This is not expected to hold in the classical case, as it would imply that PSPACE = AM. This property allows us to define simple problems involving quantum circuits that are complete for QIP.
In what follows, we consider quantum unitary circuits C that output a state in the space O ⊗ G. These spaces can be different for each circuit. O corresponds to the output space and G to the garbage space. For any circuit C, we define |φ C = C|0 in the space O ⊗ G to be the output of the circuit before the garbage space is traced out, and ρ C = Tr G (|φ C φ C |) to be the mixed state output by the circuit after the garbage space is traced out. We will also consider more general mixed state quantum circuits C, that on an input state σ and output a quantum state, denoted by C(σ). Unlike unitary circuits, mixed state circuits are allowed introducing ancillary qubits and trace out qubits during the computation. Note that circuits of this form can (approximately) represent any quantum channel. The size of a circuit C is equal to the number of gates in the circuit plus the number of qubits used by the circuit, denoted |C |. We will also use |H| to refer to the size of a Hilbert space H, i.e., |H| = log 2 dim H . We use L(H) to refer to the set of all linear operators on H, and D(H) to denote the subset of these operators that are density matrices. We consider two complete problems for QIP.
Definition 2.7 (QCD Problem). Let μ be a negligible function. We define the promise problem QCD = {QCD Y , QCD N } with input two mixed state quantum circuits C 0 , C 1 of size n as
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Definition 2.8 (Π Problem). Let μ be a negligible function. We define the promise problem Π = {Π Y , Π N } with input two mixed state quantum circuits C 0 , C 1 of size n, where for each i C i :
•
QCD is QIP-complete (Rosgen & Watrous 2005) . The QIPcompleteness of Π follows from a characterization of QIP due to Marriott & Watrous (2005) that states that any problem in QIP has a three-message protocol where the challenge from the verifier consists of a single coin flip. We may also assume that this protocol has perfect completeness and soundness error negligibly larger than 1/2. Taking the circuits C 0 and C 1 as the final circuit of the verifier in such a proof system when the challenge is either 0 or 1 results in an instance of the problem Π. The QIP-completeness of Π then follows directly from the completeness and soundness conditions on the proof system. The complexity class QSZK, introduced in Watrous (2002) , is the class of all problems that can be interactively verified by a quantum verifier who learns nothing beyond the truth of the assertion being verified. In the case that the verifier is honest, i.e., does not deviate from the protocol in an attempt to gain information, this class can be defined as 
where
Quantum computational distinguishability.
The following definitions may be found in Watrous (2009 
* and let an auxiliary-input state ensemble be a collection of mixed states {ρ x } x∈I on r(|x|) qubits for polynomial r with the property that ρ x can be efficiently generated given x. 
At first glance these definitions of distinguishability and indistinguishability are not complementary. We require distinguishability for all x ∈ I, but require indistinguishability in only all but finitely many x ∈ I. This is because |x| will be our security parameter, and so while a polynomially bounded adversary may be able to distinguish the two ensembles for a finite number of (small) values of |x|, as the parameter grows no efficient algorithm can distinguish the two ensembles.
Key to this definition is that if two ensembles are computationally distinguishable, then for all x there exists an efficient procedure in |x| that distinguishes ρ 0 x and ρ 1 x with probability at least 1/2 + 1/p(|x|). Note that this is not a uniform procedure: The circuit that distinguishes the two states may depend on x. 
If two superoperator ensembles are computationally distinguishable, then there is an efficient (non-uniform) procedure (in |x|) to distinguish them with probability at least 1/2 + 1/p(|x|) for some polynomial p. If the property of being (s, k, ε)-indistinguishable holds for all (unbounded) s and all polynomial k, 1/ε, then we call an ensemble statistically indistinguishable. Note that these definitions provide a strong quantum analog of the classical non-uniform notion of computational indistinguishability, since the nonuniformity includes an arbitrary quantum state as advice to the distinguisher.
We define a new notion that we will use later on. Intuitively, two circuits that take input in the space X ⊗Y and output a single bit are witnessable if there exist two input states that are identical on Y and are accepted by the two circuits with high probability. 
Quantum commitments.
Definition 2.18. A quantum commitment scheme (resp. with quantum advice) is an interactive protocol Com = (S, R) with the following properties
• The sender S and the receiver R have common input a security parameter 1 n (resp. both S and R have a copy of a quantum state |φ of poly(n) qubits). The sender has private input the bit b ∈ {0, 1} to be committed. Both S and R are quantum algorithms that run in time poly(n) that may exchange quantum messages.
• In the commit phase, S interacts with R in order to commit to b.
• 
.
When referring to a commitment scheme, we will use the (b s , h c ) and (b c , h s ) to denote schemes that are statistically binding and computationally hiding and schemes that are computationally binding and statistically hiding, respectively.
At a high level, the distinction between the two notions, without or with quantum advice, is the following. We can assume that the two players decide to perform a commitment scheme and agree on a security parameter n. Then, in the first case, a trusted party can give them the description of the circuits (C 0 , C 1 ) so that the cc 25 (2016) Quantum commitments 117 players can perform the commitment scheme themselves. One can think of the string (C 0 , C 1 ) as classical advice to the players. In the second case, the trusted party gives them the description of the circuits, as well as one copy of a quantum state each. This quantum state is of polynomial size; however, it is not efficiently constructible, otherwise the trusted party could have given the players the classical description of the circuit that constructs it. Hence, in the second notion, the players receive both classical and quantum advice.
Remark:
The binding constraint
x,1 reveals b = 1]) seems a bit weaker than the usual one. In the quantum, Alice can commit to b=0 and b=1 in superposition. This condition ensures that the sender cannot change the value of the committed bit. It is possible to have some stronger definition when we somehow force the receiver to measure. Stronger definitions are used for example when considering bounded or noisy storage, but this is not possible in the unconditional case. Now the question is, does this definition behave well when we use the commitment several times like for example in a zero knowledge protocol. The answer is yes. Our definition for statistical binding implies that the two possible states ρ b that the receiver has after the commit step are close to orthogonal. Similarly for computationally binding, Alice will have no way to go from one commitment state to another. In particular, using our definition of quantum bit commitment, we can perform zero knowledge protocols that require a bit commitment scheme like the zero knowledge protocol for 3 coloring.
Quantum commitments unless QSZK ⊆ QMA
The idea of the proof is to start from pairs of circuits (C 
Recall that the set QSD Y consists of pairs of circuits (C 0 , C 1 ), such that the trace norm satisfies ρ
We now consider the two auxiliary-input state ensembles {ρ
Assume for contradiction that they are quantum computationally distinguishable on QSD Y , i.e., for some polynomials p, s, k and for all (C 0 , C 1 ) ∈ QSD Y , the states ρ
In other words, for polynomials p, s, k and for all (C 0 , C 1 ) ∈ QSD Y , there exists a state σ on k(n) qubits and a quantum circuit Q of size s(n) that performs a two-outcome measurement on m(n) + k(n) qubits, such that
We now claim that this implies that QSZK ⊆ QMA, which is a contradiction. For any input (C 0 , C 1 ), the prover can send the classical polynomial size description of Q to the verifier as well as the mixed state σ with polynomial number of qubits. Then, for all (C 0 , C 1 ) ∈ QSD Y , the verifier with the help of Q and σ can distinguish between the two circuits with probability at least 1/2+ 1/(2p(n)). On the other hand, for all (C 0 , C 1 ) ∈ QSD N , no matter what Q and σ the prover sends, since ρ
≤ μ(n) the verifier can only distinguish the two circuits with probability at most 1/2+μ(n)/2. This implies that there is an inverse polynomial gap between the acceptance probabilities in the two cases. By applying standard error reduction tools for QMA (Kitaev et al. 2002; Marriott & Watrous 2005) , we obtain a QMA protocol to solve QSD.
This implies that if QSZK ⊆ QCMA then there exists a nonempty set I ⊆ QSD Y such that the two auxiliary-input state ensembles {ρ
Notice that we may take the set I to be infinite, since if I is finite, then by hard-wiring this finite number of instances into the QMA verifier (who always accepts these instances), we have again that QSZK ⊆ QMA.
We now show how to construct a commitment scheme from these ensembles.
Lemma 3.3. The two auxiliary-input state ensembles given by {ρ
Proof. For each (C 0 , C 1 ) ∈ I, we define a scheme with security parameter n = |(C 0 , C 1 )|.
• Commit phase: To commit to bit b, the sender S runs the quantum circuit C b with input |0 to create |φ C b = C b (|0 ) and sends ρ Note that all operations of the sender and the receiver in the above protocol can be computed in time polynomial in n given the input (C 0 , C 1 ), including the receiver's test during the reveal phase. The protocol is computationally hiding since {ρ
The fact that the protocol is statistically binding follows from the fact that for the states {ρ
, for a negligible function μ. More precisely, if ξ is the total quantum state sent by a dishonest sender S * in the commit and reveal phases of the protocol, then the probability that ξ can be revealed as the bit b is
using the monotonicity of the fidelity with respect to the partial trace. This calculation follows the proof of Watrous (2002) that QSZK is closed under complementation. In what follows, we consider a dishonest sender that, after the commit phase, sends one of two different states in the reveal phase, so the state held by the receiver is either ξ 0 or ξ 1 . Notice that in either case the sender sends the same state in the commit phase, so that we have tr G ξ 0 = tr G ξ 1 = γ for some γ ∈ D(O). Using this, as well as the previous equation and properties of the fidelity
The final inequality follows from the relationship between the fidelity and the trace norm as well as the fact that ρ
This implies that the protocol is statistically binding.
By combining the above lemmas: If QSZK ⊆ QMA, then there exists a non-interactive auxiliary-input quantum (b s , h c )-commitment scheme on an infinite set I.
If we are willing to relax the indistinguishability condition, i.e., enforce the indistinguishability against a quantum algorithm that has only classical auxiliary input (i.e., get rid of σ in Definition 2.11), then the condition becomes QSZK ⊆ QCMA. In Section 6, we give oracle evidence that this condition is true.
Notice also that the result of Crépeau, Légaré & Salvail (2001) allows this commitment scheme to be used as a subroutine to construct a scheme that is statistically hiding and computationally binding. From there, we have 
Quantum (b s , h c )-commitments
unless QIP ⊆ QMA First, let us note that QIP ⊆ QMA implies that PSPACE ⊆ PP which is widely believed not to be true. Hence, the commitments we exhibit are based on a very weak assumption. Using this weaker assumption, we obtain a weaker commitment scheme, in the sense that it requires quantum advice. Note that our definitions of security are against quantum adversaries that also receive arbitrary quantum advice, and hence our honest players are never more powerful than the dishonest ones. Moreover, the quantum advice does not create entanglement between the two players.
In our first construction, we start from pairs of circuits (Q did not cheat. Using the fact that the states are statistically far apart and a parallel repetition theorem for our swap-test-based protocol, we obtain negligible binding error. Similarly to the QSZK construction, we show that if QCD cannot be solved in QMA then our scheme is also computationally hiding. The remainder of this section provides the proof of this result. As a first step, we give a scheme with constant binding error based on the swap test [see Buhrman et al. (2001) for an exposition of the swap test]. Following this result, we prove a parallel repetition theorem for non-interactive swap-test-based protocols, which we then use to obtain a scheme with negligible error. 
We now claim that this implies that QIP ⊆ QMA, which is a contradiction. For any input (Q 0 , Q 1 ) the QMA-prover can send to the verifier the classical polynomial size description of D as well as the mixed state σ with poly(n) qubits. Then, for all (Q 0 , Q 1 ) ∈ QCD Y , the verifier with the help of D and σ can distinguish between the two circuits with probability higher than 1/2 + 1/(2p(n)). On the other hand, for all (Q 0 , Q 1 ) ∈ QCD N , no matter what D and σ the prover sends, since Q 0 − Q 1 ≤ μ(n) the verifier can only distinguish the two circuits with probability at most 1/2 + μ(n)/2. Hence, there is at least an inverse polynomial gap between the two probabilities, so we can use error reduction (Kitaev et al. 2002; Marriott & Watrous 2005 ) to obtain a QMA protocol that solves QCD with high probability.
Thus QIP ⊆ QMA implies that there exists a non-empty set I ⊆ QCD Y and two auxiliary-input superoperator ensembles {Q 0 } (Q 0 ,Q 1 )∈QCD Y and {Q 1 } (Q 0 ,Q 1 )∈QCD Y which are quantum computationally indistinguishable on I. Once again, the set I must be infinite, as if I is finite then by hard-wiring this finite number of instances into the QMA verifier (who always accepts these instances), we have again that QIP ⊆ QMA.
We now need to show how to construct a commitment scheme on I based on these indistinguishable superoperator ensembles. The protocol we obtain has only constant binding error: The average of the probability of successfully revealing 0 and the probability of successfully revealing 1 is negligibly larger than 3/4. Following this lemma, we prove a parallel repetition result for this protocol that reduces this error to a negligible function. 
• Define n = |(Q 0 , Q 1 )| to be the security parameter. S and R also receive as advice a copy of the state |φ * on poly(n) qubits.
• Commit phase: To commit to bit b, the sender S runs the quantum circuit 1 F ⊗ U b with input |φ * |0 . The entire output of the circuit is a state in the space F ⊗O⊗G. The sender then sends the qubits in the space O ⊗ F to the receiver R.
• Reveal phase: To reveal bit b, the sender S sends the remaining qubits of the state (1 F ⊗ U b )(|φ * |0 ) in the space G to the receiver R. The receiver first applies the operation 1 F ⊗(U b ) † to the entire state he received from the sender and then performs a swap test between this state and his copy of |φ
Let us analyze the above scheme. First, note that all operations of the sender and the receiver in the above protocol can be computed in time polynomial in n given the input (Q 0 , Q 1 ). This includes the receiver's test during the reveal phase, since given a description of a unitary circuit it can be inverted by simply taking the inverse of each gate and running the circuit in reverse and the swap test is also efficient.
The protocol is computationally hiding since the superoperators Q 0 and Q 1 are quantum computationally indistinguishable. The fact that the protocol is statistically binding (with constant error) follows from the fact that we have 
and his copy of |φ * |0 pass the swap test. This probability is equal to
where we have used the fact that the swap test on a state ρ ⊗ σ returns the symmetric outcome with probability
tr ρσ, as well as the monotonicity of the fidelity with respect to the partial trace.
Using this calculation, the binding property of the protocol is given by
where we have used Lemmas 2.1 and 2.4.
From the above two lemmas, we have that if QIP ⊆ QMA, then there exists a non-interactive auxiliary-input quantum (b s , h c )-commitment scheme with quantum advice on an infinite set I, with constant binding error.
In the remainder of this section, we show how to reduce the cheating probability of the sender to 1/2 + neg(n). To do this, we will use parallel repetition of the above protocol. Proof. The two things we have to make sure of are that the computationally hiding property remains under parallel repetition and that the cheating probability of the sender decreases as a negligible function in k. To show that the protocol is computationally hiding, we use the following lemma. applied to any product state are quantum computationally indistinguishable for any k of polynomial size. This proves that the repeated protocol remains computationally hiding, since the honest sender prepares a product state.
We now need to prove that the statistical binding property decreases to 1/2 + neg(n). We first prove the following lemma that applies to the ideal case, i.e., the receiver applies the swap test to one of two states with orthogonal reduced states. The calculation that this strategy (approximately) generalizes to the case of states that are almost orthogonal states follows the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 4.6. Let |φ 0 , |φ 1 ∈ A ⊗ B be states such that tr B |φ 0 φ 0 | and tr B |φ 1 φ 1 | are orthogonal, and let ρ 0 , ρ 1 be two states on
Consider the following test:
cc 25 (2016) Quantum commitments 127 Proof. We prove the result by induction on k. For k = 1. We have
Since tr B ρ 0 = tr B ρ 1 , this implies that
since the reduced states of |φ 0 , |φ 1 are orthogonal. Now we suppose the lemma is true for k and show it for k + 1. For convenience, we set S i = A i ⊗ B i . We take a reference space R of sufficient size to consider purifications of ρ 0 and ρ 1 . Let ρ b = tr R |ψ b ψ b | be these (arbitrary) purifications. Using this notation, we write
128 Chailloux, Kerenidis & Rosgen cc 25 (2016) 
where all |φ i , |φ j are orthogonal for i = j (for |φ 0 and |φ 1 this follows from the fact that the reduced states on A 1 are orthogonal). Since the goal is to pass swap tests with |φ 0 and |φ 1 , we can easily see that we can take α 2 = β 2 = 0 without loss of generality, since this state will only have larger probability of passing the tests. As one final notational convenience, let p i = |α i | 2 and q i = |β i | 2 . Before we analyze the probability that the swap tests pass, we show that the probabilities p 0 and q 1 satisfy p 0 + q 1 ≤ 1. By Equation (4.7), we have
By a similar calculation, we have
Then, using the fact that tr 
We now analyze the probability that the swap tests pass. Consider applying test 0 on |ψ 0 . When applying the swap test between |φ 0 and |φ 0 , the result is the state |0 |φ 0 |φ 0 where the first register corresponds to the acceptance of the swap test (0 corresponds to accept). When applying the swap test between the two states |φ 0 and |φ 1 , the result before measuring the first qubit is
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So the swap test on the space S 1 accepts with probability p 0 +p 1 /2. Conditioned on this test passing, we have the state:
Discarding the first system results in the state in S 2 ⊗· · ·⊗S k+1 ⊗R (using orthogonality of |φ 0 and |φ 1 ) given by
Let T 0 (ξ) be the probability that a state ξ ∈ S 2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ S k+1 ⊗ R passes all swap tests in S 2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ S k+1 with |φ 0 . We include the space R for convenience only: notice that the choice of purification in the space R has no effect on this probability. Using this notation, we have
Similarly, we define T 1 (ξ) for any ξ and we have
which gives us Consider the states
These states are obtained from ρ 0 and ρ 1 by discarding the system in S 1 . This implies that they have the properties in the statement of the Lemma, i.e., the reduced states of ξ 0 and x 1 on A 2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ A k+1 are equal. Thus, by induction, we know that
. This means that:
Using this, as well as Equation (4.11), we have
where the final inequality is by Equation (4.10).
Notice that in the original bit commitment protocol the receiver applies the swap test to |φ * |0 and the output of (U †
where σ b is the state sent during the protocol. Since U † b is unitary, this is equivalent to applying the swap test between σ b and the state |φ b = (U b ⊗ 1)|φ * |0 , for whatever value of b the sender has revealed. Viewed in this way, the receiver applies the swap test between σ b and one of two almost orthogonal states. Furthermore, these two states have the property that the reduced states on the space O have negligible fidelity. Notice also that the sender may send one of two states σ 0 and σ 1 depending on the value that he wishes to reveal. Since we are interested in the sum of the probabilities that the sender can successfully reveal both 0 and 1 in a given instance of the protocol, we may assume that the first message stays the same, i.e., that tr G σ 0 = tr G σ 1 . This is exactly the condition in Lemma 4.6 with the exception that instead of the cc 25 (2016) Quantum commitments 131 orthogonality of the states |φ i we have only approximate orthogonality. We are able to overcome this obstacle with the following Lemma, the proof of which makes significant use of the fact that the trace norm can be written in terms of the projectors onto the positive and negative eigenspaces of a matrix. In particular, when applied to a Hermitian operator X the trace norm is given by tr(Π + X) − tr(Π − X), where Π + and Π − are the projectors onto the positive and negative eigenspaces of X, respectively. This fact follows from the definition of the trace norm.
Lemma 4.12. Let |φ 0 , |φ 1 ∈ A ⊗ B such that
Then there exist states |φ 0 , |φ 1 ∈ A ⊗ B such that (4.13) where Π + and Π − are the projectors onto the positive and negative eigenspaces of ρ 0 − ρ 1 , respectively. Notice that
and similarly tr(Π − ρ 1 ) ≥ − tr(Π − (ρ 0 − ρ 1 )), which implies that
by Equation (4.13). This implies that tr(Π + ρ 0 ) ≥ 1 − ε and tr(Π − ρ 1 ) ≥ 1 − ε.
We introduce the states ρ i given by the (renormalized) projection of ρ 0 and ρ 1 into the spaces spanned by Π + and Π − , respectively. Since these are orthogonal projectors, the states ρ 0 and ρ 1 are orthogonal. Notice also that
132 Chailloux, Kerenidis & Rosgen cc 25 (2016) where Γ + , Γ − are the projectors onto the positive and negative eigenspaces of ρ 0 − ρ 0 , and we have also used the fact that tr(ρ 0 − ρ 0 ) = 0, which implies that the positive portion of ρ 0 − ρ 0 has the same trace as the negative portion. Consider the positive eigenspace of ρ 0 − ρ 0 . This is precisely the subspace spanned by the support of ρ 0 that lies outside the support of ρ 0 , i.e., this is exactly the space spanned by the projector Π − = Γ + . Using this observation (4.14)
where we have used the fact that tr(
A similar argument establishes the fact that (4.15)
Finally, we note that Equations (4.14) and (4.15) and Uhlmann's theorem imply that there exist purifications |φ 0 , |φ 1 ∈ A ⊗ B of ρ 0 and ρ 1 such that
This, combined with the orthogonality of ρ 0 and ρ 1 , completes the proof.
This lemma shows that we may replace the two states that are almost orthogonal with nearby states that have exactly the orthogonality property required by Lemma 4.6, which we can in turn use to show that the protocol repeated k times is statistically binding.
To do so, notice that the two states |φ 0 and |φ 1 , which are given by applying the circuits Q 0 and Q 1 to the state |φ * |0 , satisfy
These states are not orthogonal, but are nearly so. We may, however, use Lemma 4.12 to obtain |φ 0 and |φ 1 that have the orthogonality property required by Lemma 4.6 that have inner product at least 1 − μ(n) with the original states |φ 0 and |φ 1 , respectively. We now relate the probability that the state ρ passes our Test 0, i.e., the k swap tests with the state |φ 0 ⊗k to the probability that the same state ρ passes the k swap tests with the state |φ 0 ⊗k (denoted by Test 0). The difference of these probabilities is upper bounded by the trace distance of the difference of the states |φ 0 ⊗k and |φ 0 ⊗k , since we can view the swap test with ρ as a measurement to distinguish these two states. This gives
where the final inequality is Bernoulli's inequality. 
Then, we provide a QMA protocol for the problem Π. Merlin sends σ (which is of size polynomial in the input, since k(n) = |W|) and the classical description of Ψ (of size s(n)). Arthur with probability 1/2 applies Q 0 on ρ 0 (which he obtains from σ by discarding the space W) and accepts if he gets 1; and with probability 1/2 he first creates ρ 1 from Ψ and σ, then applies Q 1 on it and also accepts if he gets 1. 
We have an inverse polynomial gap between completeness and soundness, and hence we conclude that Π ∈ QMA. This proves that there is a non-empty I that satisfies the property of our lemma. Note that if I is finite, then by hard-wiring this finite number of instances into the QMA verifier (who always accepts these instances), we have again that QIP ⊆ QMA. So if QIP ⊆ QMA, then the set I can be taken to be infinite.
136 Chailloux, Kerenidis & Rosgen cc 25 (2016) To finish the proof of the theorem, we now need to show the following. μ(n) . For consistency with our definitions, we also suppose that the receiver gets a copy of ρ 0 , ρ 1 . These states will not be used in the honest case and they will not harm the security for a cheating receiver.
• (Commit phase) To commit to b, the sender sends the state in Y b to the receiver.
• (Reveal phase) To reveal b, the sender sends the state in X b . The receiver applies Q b on the space X b ⊗ Y b and accepts if he gets 1.
Statistical hiding property:
The states that the receiver gets in the commit phase satisfy tr X ρ 0 = tr X ρ 1 , and hence our scheme is perfectly hiding. 
Quantum oracle relative to which QSZK HV ⊆ QCMA
In order to prove the desired result we find a problem in QSZK HV and prove a black-box lower bound in the QCMA model. We end up with a quantum oracle, as the constructed problem makes essential use of quantum information. This approach is due to Aaronson & Kuperberg (2007) , who prove a similar result for QMA versus QCMA. The argument given here is related to the argument of Aaronson and Kuperberg, both in structure and in the fact that we make use of a bound on the expected overlap of a state drawn from a p-uniform distribution with a fixed state. The main difference is that in the problem we consider we need to extend the proof to the case where it is a unitary operator that is hidden inside the oracle, not a pure state. Note that subsequent to the completion of this work, Aaronson (2012) has shown the stronger result that there is an oracle relative to which SZK ⊆ QMA. For our result, we consider a black-box that takes as input a control qubit, chooses a random pure state |ψ and applies a fixed but hidden d by d unitary U to half of |ψ , controlled by the input qubit. The hidden unitary U can be inverted by a QSZK prover, but in the QCMA model, the verifier cannot invert U and recover the input with making an exponential number of queries to the black-box.
138 Chailloux, Kerenidis & Rosgen cc 25 (2016) We prove a lower bound on the number of queries needed by a QCMA verifier to distinguish this black-box from one that simply generates random pure states. 6.1. Background. Before proving the oracle result, we review some background on measures on quantum states and channels that will be used in the proof. Let U(H) be the group of unitary matrices acting on a Hilbert space H. When no confusion is likely to arise, we will also use the notation U(d), where dim H = d. The set of pure states on H, i.e., the unit sphere in H, is given by S(H) or S d−1 . We refer to d-dimensional spaces for convenience: in general d = 2 n for some space of n qubits.
Throughout this section, the uniform measure on states and unitaries is given by the Haar measure. In the case of unitaries, we use μ U(H) to denote the Haar measure on the unitaries on H, that is, the unique left and right invariant measure normalized so that μ U(H) (U(H)) = 1. When the space in question is clear, we will drop the subscript and use only μ to refer to this measure. The Haar measure on S(H) can be obtained by applying a random U ∈ U(H) to a fixed pure state (the invariance of the Haar measure implies that the choice of the fixed state does not matter). We will use μ S(H) to refer to this measure.
Essential to our argument is the notion of a probability measure that is nearly uniform. Following Aaronson & Kuperberg (2007) , given a measure σ we say that it is p-uniform if pσ ≤ μ, where μ is the uniform measure over the space in question. This notion is directly related to the class QCMA by the fact that if the verifier starts with a uniform measure and conditions on a m-bit classical message, the result is a (2 −m )-uniform measure. The main technical result of this section will be to show that such a measure over U(d) does not help the verifier identify a particular unitary, unless m ∈ Ω(d). This result follows by a reduction to the pure state case, which is the key to the quantum oracle that separates QMA and QCMA (Aaronson & Kuperberg 2007) .
